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I. INTRODUCTION
Wildlife occupies a unique place on the American landscape and in
the American mind. It is both protected as a cherished treasure and ex-
ploited like many other resources. From almost any perspective, personal
feeling and public debate over wildlife policy are grounded in a funda-
mental belief: Wildlife is a public resource. Even our literature and our art
embody this belief.' Nonetheless, wildlife populations have steadily de-
clined for decades. Some species have gone quietly to extinction, while
others remain only in fragile populations.2 The steady erosion and elimi-
nation of wildlife populations have occurred without public recompense,
financial or otherwise, despite widespread acknowledgement of wildlife as
a public resource.
Air, water, and wildlife are all resources of the commons, yet each
presents distinct challenges in both legal construct and practical manage-
ment. Unlike air and water, wildlife is bound to the land, and each species
has special habitat needs. This attachment to the land has caused wildlife
law to develop its own unique character.3 As we look towards an ever
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1. See, e.g., RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1982) (tracing how
wilderness and wildlife in America have been perceived since the colonial period, and the role they
have played in the development of American arts and culture).
2. See generally ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY: FINDING THE LESsONS, IMPROVING THE
PROCESS (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 1994).
3. Starting as early as the Roman Empire and extending through western history, landowners
enjoyed the exclusive authority to reduce wildlife on their lands to possession and thus to acquire
ownership of the wildlife. This authority presumably was associated with the bundle of rights inherent
in land ownership. See MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WnDI.rn LAW 10 (1983).
Under modern state laws, property owners' right to hunt wildlife on their lands is subject to state
regulation, although special privileges may be afforded them. See, e.g., Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d
1324 (9th Cir. 1988); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994).
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larger and more demanding human population, towards continued urban-
ization and destruction of habitat, it is well worth examining this legal
relationship with wildlife.' Understanding this relationship is even more
critical in an era of increased efforts to weaken the nation's major envi-
ronmental laws, including the Endangered Species Act of 1973.' Environ-
mental laws are threatened, in part, by growing assertions that private
property rights take precedence over public resource concerns.' To listen
to some politicians and some property owners, any infringement by the
public's wildlife on private property rights is an uncompensated taking
that violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Completely lost in
this rhetoric is any recognition that wildlife also has value, or that any
private gain realized through its destruction is offset by a public loss.
State authority to regulate and conserve wildlife is well established.'
This article argues that states have not only the authority to regulate and
conserve wildlife, but also an affirmative duty to do so. Under the public
trust doctrine, the state serves as trustee of its wildlife resource. As trustee,
the state must protect the corpus of its wildlife trust by preventing its
unreasonable exploitation and by seeking compensation for unavoidable
losses. This duty stems from the special relationship created by the state's
ownership of its wildlife in its sovereign capacity, and the public's expec-
tation that the state holds this common resource for the benefit of the people.
The public trust doctrine extends beyond the state's ordinary police
4. Wildlife regulation is an interplay between state and federal authority. See generally BEAN,
supra note 3, at 17-36. In general, states have exclusive authority to regulate and conserve wildlife
within their borders, so long as no issues of federal regulatory preemption or federal questions are
presented. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). Federal preemption may occur under certain
statutes enacted by the federal government for wildlife protection and conservation. For instance, fed-
eral statutes have been enacted to protect threatened and endangered species, Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), to regulate the trade of animal parts in in-
terstate and international commerce, Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988
& Supp. V 1993), and to protect certain species of animals under the federal treaty power, Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Further, federal questions
may be presented when state wildlife regulations interfere with federal powers under certain constitu-
tional provisions. Hughes, 441 U.S. 322 (Commerce Clause); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1975) (Property Clause); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (the treaty power). See generally
BEAN, supra note 3, at 20-34.
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
6. See, e.g., "Contract with America," H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
7. Takings: Compensation to Landowners Can Make Sense, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March
22, 1995, at 24a. For an explanation of why courts historically have denied compensation for direct
property injury caused by wildlife, see Stephen Tan, Comment, The Watchtower Casts no Shadow:
Nonliability of Federal and State Governments for Property Damage Inflicted by Wildlife, 61 U.
COLO. L. REv. 427 (1990). Additionally, private property owners are restricted from modifying land
that provides habitat for endangered species. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (holding that habitat modification constitutes a violation of the
Endangered Species Act's "take" provision).
8. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334-36; see generally BEAN, supra note 3, at 12-47.
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power and requires the state to take affirmative action to protect its wild-
life base. By affording judicial review of state actions affecting the wild-
life resource, the public trust doctrine offers a means by which a court can
place a "check" on legislative grants of public lands and other government
conduct affecting wildlife.9 Moreover, under the public trust doctrine and
the associated doctrine of parens patriae, the state may bring suit to re-
cover for injury to wildlife. Legislation need not be in place for states to
take action to protect their wildlife.'"
Section II of this article reviews the public trust doctrine and explains
how the state's sovereign ownership of its wildlife resource imposes pub-
lic trust duties. It then examines the nature and extent of these duties, and
illustrates their application inthe context of state authorization of domestic
sheep grazing in bighorn sheep habitat. Section HI considers the related
doctrine of parens patriae, which enables states to fulfill their public trust
duties by providing them legal standing to bring suit to protect their wild-
life resource. Lastly, Section IV argues for the continuing need for the
judicial mechanisms provided by these doctrines, despite similar state
duties stemming from sources outside of the common law.
If. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Under the public trust doctrine, the state holds natural resources in
trust for the benefit of the people." The state may not destroy or relin-
quish its control over public resources except under certain, very narrow
circumstances.' 2 The state's ownership of the resource as sovereign is the
source of the state's public trust rights and obligations, and affords the
state special authorities while imposing on it certain duties."
This article focuses on the application of the public trust doctrine to
wildlife. Although most public trust cases involve water and water-related
resources, public trust principles apply equally well to wildlife. The few
cases that do address the application of these principles to wildlife support
this argument.'4 Because this article focuses on the modem application of
the public trust doctrine, it does not provide an exhaustive review of the
doctrine's historical origins.'5 The core of the doctrine has remained un-
9. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 MlcH. L. REv. 471, 495 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Public Trust Doctrine].
10. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
11. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 637-41 (1986); see also Sax,
Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 484-89.
12. See Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 489-91.
13. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 637-38.
14. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896); infra notes 55, 63 and accompanying
text.
15. The notion of sovereign ownership of natural resources began under Roman law, which
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changed since its inception: Natural resources such as wildlife are com-
mon to all citizens, and the state, in its sovereign capacity, is expected to
govern these common resources for the public benefit.
6
A. The Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Water Resources
The modem public trust doctrine was first introduced into the United
States courts in the context of water-related resources. 7 Specifically,
courts considered state authority with respect to the lands under the navi-
gable waterways that traditionally belonged to the states in their sovereign
capacity. The United States Supreme Court's seminal decision in Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois" set forth the central tenet of the public tnst
doctrine: Under principles of sovereign ownership, the state holds natural
resources in trust for the people and must protect that trust.'9
The Illinois Central Court considered the competency of the Illinois
Legislature to enact a statute conveying huge portions of the bed of Lake
Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad." The Court held that because
the state holds submerged lands in trust for the people, it cannot alienate
those lands without some clear benefit to the trust."' The Court conclud-
ed, accordingly, that the state could revoke the conveyance.22
In reaching this decision; the Illinois Central Court considered exten-
sively the nature of sovereign ownership of waterways. It traced the histo-
ry of their ownership from English common law through colonization to
statehood. 3 The Court noted that title to lands under tidal waters had
been vested in the king as a public trust under the common law of Eng-
land.24 After the Revolution, the states became sovereign, and "in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters ... for their
own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
constitution to the general government."' Based on this sovereign owner-
provided that natural resources, including running water, air, wildlife, and the ocean and its shores, had
no owner and therefore "are naturally everybody's." J. INST. 2.1(1)-2.1(5). For a comprehensive review
of the historical origins of the doctrine, see Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 475-91.
16. See Gary G. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to In-
clude Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENvTL. L. 723, 728 (1989).
17. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 636-40.
18. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
19. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-53. While the decision concerned the bed of a navigable
waterway, sovereign ownership survives as the basis for applying the public trust doctrine to other re-
sources. See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 637-40.
20. 146 U.S. at 452.
21. Id. at 452-53.
22. Id. at 463-64.
23. Id. at 455-58.
24. Id. at 458.
25. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 456 (citations omitted).
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ship, the Court concluded that the state served as trustee of the property,
and held the property for the benefit of the people.as
The Illinois Central Court held that in light of this trust relationship,
the state cannot unilaterally divest its citizens of their common right to the
public trust through the conveyance of trust property to private hands.'
Further, the Court reasoned that the state cannot grant individuals private
rights that would prejudice this public trust' The Illinois Central Court
predicted that, absent judicial overview under the public trust doctrine,
"every harbor in the country [would be placed] at the mercy of a majority
of the legislature of the State in which the harbor is situated." 9 Fearful
that without judicial intervention, such private advantages might result
because of insufficiencies in the democratic process, the Court determined
that judicial protection of the trust corpus was necessary. 0
Whereas the Illinois Central Court confronted the public trust issue in
the context of lands underlying waterways, the core of the public trust
doctrine applies more generally to wildlife3' and other natural resources.
Courts apply the public trust doctrine to protect water-related and wildlife-
related recreation activities such as boating, rafting, and hunting, as well
as wildlife habitat.32 Further, courts have recognized that the doctrine
applies broadly, and that its applications reflect changes in the general
public interest as they occur over time.3 Nevertheless, the applicability
of the public trust doctrine to protect wildlife derives directly from the
state's sovereign ownership of this resource. Like their ownership of the
beds beneath navigable waterways, states own wildlife in their sovereign
capacity and thereby have a public trust duty to prevent impairment of this
26. Id. at 455-56.
27. Id. at 456.
28. Id. at 458.
29. Id. at 455.
30. Id. This fear of insufficiencies in the democratic process remains the underlying rationale
for invoking the public trust doctrine. See Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 495 ("[I]t will
often be the case that the whole of the public interest has not been adequately considered by the legis-
lative or administrative officials.. . ."); id. at 561 (asserting that the role of the courts in applying the
public trust doctrine is one of democratization).
31. See Meyers, supra note 16, at 724-25; infra notes 34-61 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y
v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) [hereinafter Mono
Lake]; Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); State ex reL Brown v. Newport Concrete
Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
33. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (NJ. 1984) (ac-
knowledging that the public trust doctrine is not fixed but can be molded and extended to meet chang-
ing conditions and public needs), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Sharon M. Kelly, Comment, The
Public Trust and the Constitution: Routes to Judicial Overview of Resource Management Decisions in
Virginia, 75 VA. L. REV. 895, 911 n.108 (1989); see also Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719-20 (expanding
the public trust doctrine to reflect changing public perception of the values of the waterways).
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common resource.
B. The Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Wildlife
When courts consider whether a state has the authority or the duty to
regulate hunting or protect wildlife, they consistently trace the source of
the state's authority to its sovereign ownership of the wildlife resource.34
While alternative sources, such as the police power, may provide the nec-
essary authority,35 courts primarily invoke sovereign ownership theory.36
By relying upon the state's sovereign ownership interest as the basis for
the state's authority to manage wildlife, these courts essentially have
adopted the public trust doctrine.
In Geer v. Connecticut,"' the United States Supreme Court expressly
adopted the theory of state sovereign ownership of wildlife and implicitly
adopted the public trust doctrine. The Court considered whether the state,
in light of the Commerce Clause, had the authority to regulate the killing
of game within its borders by forbidding its transportation outside of the
state.38 It held that the state did have the requisite authority, and that the
Commerce Clause did not limit such state regulation of game.39 In reach-
ing its holding, the Geer Court considered the nature of the state's interest
in wildlife. Much like the Illinois Central Court, the Geer Court relied on
the history of the state's sovereign responsibilities over its natural resourc-
es for the benefit of the people.'
The Geer Court considered principles of English common law and
Roman law.4 Under Roman law, wild animals had no owner and there-
fore belonged "in common to all citizens of the state."'42 Under English
common law, wild animals similarly were under common ownership, 43
34. State v. Fertterer, 841 P.2d 467, 470-71 (Mont. 1992); State v. Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d
409, 411 (Ohio 1974); Hanley v. State, 126 N.E.2d 879, 882 (Ohio 1955); Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d
412, 414 (Wyo. 1973).
35. As Professor Lazarus argues and courts have noted in passing, the rubric of the state's
police power encompasses regulation of wildlife. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 665-68; infra notes 186-91
and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979) (indirectly referencing the police
power).
37. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
38. Geer, 161 U.S. at 522.
39. Id. at 534.
40. Compare Geer, 161 U.S. at 522-30, and Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 455-58 (each tracing
sovereign ownership of the resource from its origins in English common law through the Revolution,
and ultimately to each state by way of the equal footing doctrine).
41. 161 U.S. at 522-28.
42. Id. at 522.
43. Id. at 526.
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with the king, as sovereign owner, maintaining ultimate authority." This
principle of governmental control of wildlife was carried over into Ameri-
can society upon colonization and ultimately through the Revolution.'
The Geer Court reasoned that the state must exercise this power over
wildlife "as a trust for the benefit for the people, and not as a prerogative
for the advantage of'the government, as distinct from the people, or for
the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public
good," in much the same way it must exercise its power over the beds
underlying navigable waterways, which the state likewise owns in its
sovereign capacity.47 Essentially mirroring the Illinois Central ruling,"
the Geer Court thus enunciated the central tenet of the public trust doc-
trine and applied it to the state's duties associated with sovereign owner-
ship of wildlife.49
The Geer holding remained law for nearly a century, until the U.S.
Supreme Court reconsidered Geer's constitutional interpretation in Hughes
v. Oklahoma."0 The Hughes Court concluded that an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the interstate shipment of wild fish captured in the state violat-
ed the Commerce Clause.5' While overruling Geer as to the constitution-
ality of state prohibitions against interstate wildlife shipping,52 Hughes
preserved the sovereign ownership analysis set forth in Geer.53 With re-
spect to the continuing applicability of the sovereign ownership theory, the
Hughes Court explained, "The whole ownership theory, in fact, is... but
a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that
a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an impor-
44. Id. at 527.
45. Id. at 528-30.
46. Id. at 529.
47. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-53.
48. See id. at 455, 457-458. The Illinois Central Court concluded that the lands were "held by
the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public," id. at 455, "for the use of the people at
large," id. at 457, and that the state may not prejudice the public interest. Id. at 458.
49. Neither the Geer Court nor the Illinois Central Court used the term "public trust." Rather,
each outlined the role of the state as trustee of the public resources by virtue of its sovereignty, and
acknowledged a public trust responsibility.
50. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
51. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 338.
52. The Hughes Court stated, "We now conclude that challenges under the Commerce Clause
to state regulations of wild animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied to
state regulations of other natural resources, and therefore expressly overrule Geer." Id. at 335.
53. Id. at 335-36, 338-39. "Mhe general rule we adopt in this case makes ample allowance for
preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, the legitimate state concerns for con-
servation and protection of wild animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of state ownership."
Id. at 335-36. The Hughes Court's primary concern with the ownership theory was the Geer Court's
conclusion that since the state represented the citizens, who owned in common all the wild animals in
the state, the state could "control not only the taking of game but also the ownership of game that had
been lawfully reduced to possession." Id. at 327.
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tant resource."54 After the Hughes decision, state authority to regulate
wildlife under the "fiction" of sovereign ownership remains intact." The
Hughes holding applies only when state regulation of wildlife conflicts
with powers delegated by the Constitution to the federal government. 6
Since Hughes, several courts have applied sovereign ownership theo-
ry, and the public trust duties it implies, to wildlife issues.57 Some courts
have applied the public trust concept directly. 8 Others have not described
the state's interest in wildlife by using the term "public trust," but have
essentially adopted the concept by ruling that the state holds its wildlife in
its sovereign capacity for the use and benefit of the people. 9 Implicitly,
these courts recognize that because of the state's role as trustee and the
potential for abuse of the legislative process, there may be a need for a
judicial oversight of government actions which affect these resouces.
The state must act on behalf of all citizens to protect these resources under
the public trust doctrine.6"
54. Id. at 334 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)).
55. See, e.g., Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Wyo. 1994) (concluding
that, after Hughes, the state's role in governing and conserving wildlife remains unchanged); Fertterer,
841 P.2d at 470 ("There is no federal constitutional issue or other federal question presented in the
present case. As a result, the holding in Hughes is not controlling here."). In In re Steuart Transp. Co.,
the Court stated:
The authority in support of th[e] position ... [that the State of Virginia does not "own" the
migratory waterfowl in question] ... is clear and voluminous.... However, many of the
cases refuting a state's claim to ownership of resources turned upon principles of federalism
and pre-emption by federal legislation of state control measures. Neither of these principles
is applicable to the current issue before this court.
495 F. Supp. 39-40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (citations ommited).
56. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-36.
57. See, e.g., Fertterer, 841 P.2d at 470; O'Brien v. Wyoming, 711 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo.
1986); see also Washington ex rel. Lopas v. Shagren, 157 P. 31 (Wash. 1916).
58. See In re Steuart, 495 F. Supp. at 38 (ruling that Virginia holds wildlife in trust for the
public); State v. Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974) (noting that Ohio has consistently
recognized the trust doctrine with respect to wildlife); Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1992)
(holding that the state holds wildlife as well as water as trustee).
59. See, e.g., Fertterer, 841 P.2d at 470-71 (holding that the state holds wildlife "in its sover-
eign capacity for the use and benefit of the people generally") (quoting Rosenfeld v. Jakways, 216 P.
776, 777 (Mont. 1923)).
60. See id. at 495. The Montana Supreme Court stated:
While it will seldom be true that a particular governmental act can be termed corrupt ....
there is a strong, if not demonstrable, implication that [certain] acts in question represent a
response to limited and self-interested proponents of public action .... The concessions de-
sired by those interests are often of limited visibility to the general public so that public
sentiment is not aroused; but the importance of the grants to those who seek them may lead
to extraordinarily vigorous and persistent efforts.
Id. See also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
61. Resources protected under the public trust doctrine are (1) so important to each citizen that
their free availability is essential to free society, (2) "so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that
they ought to be reserved for the whole of the populace," or (3) so "peculiarly public [in] nature
that ... their adaptation to private use [is] inappropriate." Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at
PUBLIC TRUST & PARENS PATRIAE
C. The Scope and Application of Public Trust Duties
Enforcement of the public trust concept requires an understanding of
the scope of the state's duties regarding the public resource. As sovereign
owner of wildlife, the state has a duty to protect the corpus of its wildlife
trust from substantial impairment. Yet if the state fails to fulfill this duty,
individuals may seek relief in the courts.62 While courts have not yet pos-
tulated a precise definition of the state's duty under the public trust doc-
trine,' certain guiding themes have emerged. This section develops spe-
cific guidelines for the state's duty to protect wildlife by reviewing public
trust case law.
1. Duties Imposed by the Public Trust Doctrine
The common law public trust doctrine guides judicial review of state
conduct. When courts apply the public trust doctrine, they generally view
state conduct towards the trust resource with skepticism.'
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that re-
source to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest
of private parties.'
This skepticism, stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Illi-
nois Central,' suggests that the role of the public trust doctrine is to pro-
tect the public interest from "insufficiencies of the democratic process."'67
Under the public trust doctrine, the courts place checks on the other
branches of government.68 When the legislature or an administrative
agency fails to fully consider the public interest in making a decision that
484-85.
62. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT. A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
AcTION 158-174 (1970) [hereinafter SAX, CrrzEN AcnON] (the public trust doctrine creates a public
right to enforce resource protection); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its
Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 155 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Historical Shackles] (the idea
of the public trust is to protect the public's expectations).
63. In fact, few courts have considered the scope of the state's duty to protect wildlife under
the public trust doctrine. See Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 496 (Alaska 1988) (finding that the
public trust duty prohibits the state from awarding any monopolistic grants or special privileges); Tex-
as E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 225 A.2d 130, 137 (NJ. 1966) (indicating that
preservation of wildlife is a public purpose that merits consideration).
64. See Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 490.
65. Id.
66. 146 U.S. at 455. See also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
67. Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 521.
68. Id. at 495-96.
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affects a trust resource, or engages in "dubious governmental conduct," '69
the public trust doctrine provides a mechanism by which the courts may
intervene to protect the resource.7"
The state, as trustee, must prevent substantial impairment of the wild-
life resource so as to preserve it for the beneficiaries-current and future
generations.71 Under the public trust doctrine, the state must: (1) consider
the potential adverse impacts of any proposed activity over which it has
administrative authority;72 (2) allow only activities that do not substantial-
ly impair the state's wildlife resources;73 (3) continually monitor the im-
pacts of an approved activity on the wildlife to ensure preservation of the
corpus of the trust;74 and (4) bring suit under the parens patriae doctrine
to enjoin harmful activities and/or to recover for damages to wildlife.75
The Illinois Central decision provides some guidance regarding the
nature of the state's public trust duty. The Illinois Central Court held that
the state has a duty to prevent substantial impairment of the resource.76
States may not permit private activities that will prejudice the public's
sovereign interest without a compelling government public purpose." To
fulfill this obligation, the government necessarily must consider the ad-
verse impacts of a proposed action on trust resources to determine whether
these activities would cause "substantial impairment" of the trust re-
source.
78
After Illinois Central, few courts considered the nature of the state's
duty as trustee until the early 1980s. In 1983, the California Supreme
Court considered the public trust doctrine in the context of water appropri-
ation rights in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine
County79 (Mono Lake). In Mono Lake, conservation groups sought an in-
junction to prevent the diversion of water from nonnavigable streams in
the Mono Lake watershed based on the theory that the waters were pro-
69. Id. at 491. General applications of the public trust doctrine include instances in which the
government favors narrow, private uses over broad, public ones. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 455-56.
72. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
73. See Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Substan-
tive Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 749, 756-57 (1992).
74. Id.
75. Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596, 606
(Cal. CL App. 1990); State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975). For a discussion of the doctrine of parens patriae and its relation to the public trust
doctrine, see infra notes 113-73 and accompanying text.
76. See 146 U.S. at 455-46 (state has a duty not to take action that will harm the public inter-
est).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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tected by the public trust." The court required the state agency to consid-
er public trust values in approving the water project8 and further re-
quired the agency to act to preserve the public trust interests.'
The Mono Lake court considered the purpose of the trust, the scope
of the trust, and the powers and duties of the state as trustee of the public
trust." Values at issue in Mono Lake included the aesthetic enjoyment of
rivers and lakes and the preservation of the indigenous flora and fauna and
their habitat.84 With respect to the purposes and scope of the public trust,
the court determined that these values fell under the protection afforded by
the public trust doctrine.'
In defining the powers and duties of the state as trustee, the Mono
Lake court considered the relationship between the public trust doctrine
and California water law. Predictably, the parties took opposing positions
regarding which competing legal system should prevail.86 The court re-
fused to apply one system over the other. It noted that both legal frame-
works have developed independently and "embody important precepts."'
In an effort to accommodate both systems, the court concluded, "The state
has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the
planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses
whenever feasible."'8
The court observed that a state's failure to consider public trust val-
ues before making planning decisions may result in the "needless destruc-
tion of those values."' 9 It therefore required state agencies not only to
consider public trust values, but also to take measures to preserve these
interests.' Further, the court noted that once the state approves an appro-
priation of water rights, it has a duty to continue supervising the use of
80. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712.
81. Id. at 728. This obligation to consider the impacts of proposed activities stands independent
of the state's obligations under the various state environmental policy acts (SEPAs). The public trust
obligation goes further than the obligations under the SEPAs because it not only requires the state to
undertake certain procedural steps, but also to make the substantive decision to prohibit activities that
will substantially impair the trust resource. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
82. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728.
83. Id. at 718-24.
84. Id. at 715.
85. Id. at 719. The court also considered whether the public trust doctrine governs nonnavigable
tributaries of navigable waterways, and concluded that the public trust doctrine necessarily "protects
navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries." Id. at 721 (citations
omitted).
86. Id. at 727.
87. Id.
88. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728.
89. Id. at 712.
90. Id.
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this water.91 In sum, the Mono Lake decision stands for the proposition
that state agencies should undertake advance consideration of public trust
values, act to preserve those values, and continually supervise conduct that
affects those values. Although few wildlife cases have fleshed out the
public trust duty, courts should set forth similar duties in the wildlife
context.92
As typified by Mono Lake, courts have applied the public trust doc-
trine to restrict state actions that may harm the trust resource.93 Courts
have restricted these actions to varying degrees. Some courts have fol-
lowed the Mono Lake approach of requiring the sovereign to consider any
potentially adverse impacts associated with a proposed action and to allow
the action to proceed only if the impacts are minimal or necessary. 94 Oth-
er courts have advocated more of a balancing approach.95 In the context
of lawsuits challenging administrative agency actions, some courts have
held that the agency may take action that impairs the public trust resource
only if the legislature has authorized such action expressly.
96
Moreover, in state-initiated lawsuits for damages, courts have found
that the state has not only the ability, but also the obligation to bring suit
when its resources are imperiled.97 This duty stems from the expectation
that the state will act to protect the rights of the public in the corpus of
the natural resource trust.98 Several courts have reiterated this duty, em-
phasizing that "[t]he State has not only the right but also the affirmative
fiduciary obligation to... seek compensation for any diminution in that
trust corpus."" As early as 1977, Michael Bean noted this common law
trend toward recognizing an affirmative duty on the part of the states to
91. Id. at 728.
92. See e.g., Texas E. Transmission Corp., 225 A.2d at 137-38 (indicating that preservation of
wildlife is a public purpose that merits consideration).
93. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 650-56.
94. See id. at 650-52.
95. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1157 (La.
1984) (indicating that a balancing test is an appropriate method to determine issues such as appropri-
ateness of hazardous waste disposal facility); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 713
(Or. 1979) (concluding that the extent of public need for filling estuarine land must be balanced
against interference with water-related uses); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1974) (balancing development with resource management under public trust concept).
96. Lazarus, supra note 11, at 654-55.
97. See In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980); State v. S.S.
Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1969); State v. Jersey Cent. Power, 308 A.2d 671,
674 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973); State v. Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974).
98. See, e.g., Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 271 Cal. Rptr.
596, 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
99. Id. at 606 (quoting State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. App.
Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337, 344 (N.J. 1976)).
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bring suit to protect the public trust."°
Hence, while the public trust doctrine does not necessarily require
"pure" preservation, it does insist on maintaining the diversity and stability
of the resident biotic community.' It places restrictions on conduct that
may adversely affect the stability of the resource by providing a mecha-
nism by which the judiciary can safeguard public expectations regarding
the protection of common resources.
2. Illustration of the Duty to Protect Wildlife
The public trust doctrine imposes certain duties on the state in its role
as trustee of wildlife. Regardless of whether an activity occurs on public
or private land, the state must not permit the activity to significantly di-
minish the wildlife resource. While these duties are well-founded in case
law, their applicability in the wildlife context has yet to be thoroughly
defined by the courts. This section considers the state's dufy to protect
wildlife in the context of allowing grazing on public lands.
Recently, several Montana-based conservation groups challenged the
state's decision to allow domestic sheep grazing in bighom sheep habitat
because domestic sheep transmit disease to bighorn sheep." These
groups challenged the legality of the state's decision, in part, on the
grounds that the public trust doctrine required the state to protect wildlife
when making permitting decisions. This case (the Montana Sheep case) is
now on appeal to the Montana Supreme Court.'
The facts of the Montana Sheep case are straightforward. Under state
permit, cattle have grazed the Sula State Forest for years. In 1972, with
the assent of local landowners, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks transplanted bighorns from the Sun River Game Preserve to the
Sula Forest. Since then, a bighorn population has established itself across
the forest and on adjacent national forest lands. Today, the Sula herd is
one of the most visible bighorn sheep populations in the northern Rockies
and provides both recreational viewing and hunting opportunities."°
In 1991, the Department of State Lands (DSL) approved the transfer
of the Sula grazing permits to George R. Madden, who had purchased
adjacent private lands. After securing the permit, Mr. Madden began graz-
100. BEAN, supra note 3, at 34-45.
101. See Bader, supra note 73, at 756-57.
102. Ravalli County Fish and Game Ass'n, Inc. v. Montana Dep't of State Lands, No. CV-93-
148 (Mont. 21st Dist. August 10, 1994) (opinion and order), appealfiled January 6, 1995.
103. See id. The district court did not consider the application of the public trust doctrine but
granted defendants' summary judgment case on all other grounds.
104. Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellants at 5, Ravalli County Fish & Game Ass'n v. Montana Dep't
of State Lands, No. 94-564 (Mont. 1995).
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ing domestic sheep instead of cattle. The shift from cattle to sheep is
significant in light of the high incidence of disease transmission from
domestic and wild sheep;" 5 in fact, such disease transmission contributed
substantially to the original extirpation of bighorns across much of the
West."°6
After several conservation groups threatened litigation, DSL prepared
an environmental assessment (EA) to evaluate the impacts of domestic
sheep grazing. DSL adopted the EA on December 30, 1992. The EA al-
lowed Mr. Madden to continue grazing his domestic sheep in proximity to
the bighorns. Accordingly, several groups filed suit in May 1993. On
August 10, 1994, the district court granted the defendants summary judg-
ment on all counts. 7 Plaintiffs appealed the district court's ruling on
several grounds. Amicus National Wildlife Federation and the plaintiffs
argued that the court erred by failing to consider and apply the public trust
doctrine.
As explained above, the public trust doctrine imposes a duty on the
state to protect its wildlife from substantial impairment or degradation. In
the Montana Sheep case, amicus argued that DSL, acting as an agent of
the state, failed to assess the impacts of domestic grazing on wildlife val-
ues and failed to ensure preservation of these values.' 8 DSL approved
domestic grazing without making a determination of the impacts. In addi-
tion to violating the statutory provisions of the Montana Environmental
Policy Act (MEPA),' ° the state's failure to make an impact determina-
tion contravenes its public trust responsibilities."' Like MEPA, the pub-
lic trust doctrine requires the state to evaluate the impacts of a proposed
action; the public trust doctrine additionally imposes the substantive re-
quirement that the state not approve an action that will impair trust re-
source values."' Thus, the full scope of the state's duty to wildlife en-
compasses not only procedural compliance with MEPA, but also substan-
tive adherence to the trust obligations.
If DSL had adequately evaluated the impacts of domestic sheep graz-
105. Montana Dep't of State Lands, Sula State Forest Grazing Licenses Revised EA (Dec. 1992)
[hereinafter Revised EAJ; see also Deposition of John Firebaugh, Regional Director for Montana Dep't
of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, March 1994 (filed with Mont. 21st Dist. Court) [hereinafter Firebaugh
Deposition] (on file with author).
106. Revised EA, supra note 105, at 5; Deposition of Firebaugh, supra note 105, at 8-9.
107. Ravalli County Fish and Game Ass'n, No. CV-93-148, slip op. at 18.
108. Id. at 15.
109. Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to 324
(1971). MEPA, like its federal counterpart, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), requires state agencies to evaluate the impacts of major actions
prior to approving these actions. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201.
110. See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712.
111. See Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 455; supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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ing in Sula bighom habitat, it may not have allowed sheep grazing consid-
ering the overwhelming evidence that contact between domestic sheep and
bighorns seriously endangers the health and welfare of the wild bighorns.
Domestic sheep grazing in bighorn habitat jeopardizes the bighorn
population's stability."' Accordingly, amicus urged the court to conclude
that the state inappropriately approved activities that would have signifi-
cant impacts on the wildlife resource. Such serious endangerment of a
wildlife resource is exactly the type of harm the state must prevent under
the public trust doctrine.
The Montana Sheep case is an example of how private groups can
seek to enforce the state's public trust duties when the state has failed to
do so. Often, however, these roles are reversed; that is, private individuals
have damaged public trust resources, and the state wishes to protect the
trust. In such situations, the judicial system often places states in a curious
dilemma: Although a state may be compelled to bring a suit to fulfill its
obligation to preserve the trust, it may be unable to do so because courts
may find that mere sovereign ownership of wildlife-as opposed to a
claim of outright title-is not a sufficient property interest to give the state
legal standing to sue. The common law doctrine of parens patriae offers a
way out of this dilemma.
H. THE DocTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE
Like the public trust doctrine, the parens patriae doctrine rests on the
notion that the state should act to protect common resources because it is
the sovereign owner of those resources."' Whereas the public trust doc-
trine recognizes that the democratic process may fail to protect a state's
trust resources, the doctrine of parens patriae recognizes that the judiciary
may fail to provide for entities incapable of representing themselves, or
for the general welfare of the people."4 This judicial failure stems from
the likelihood that these entities lack the capacity to bring suit themselves;
without this common law doctrine, the state may be denied standing pur-
suant to Article I of the Constitution."5 As parens patriae, the state has
standing to seek injunctive relief or resource damages' 6 based on either
112. Revised EA, supra note 105, at 7-11.
113. See, e.g., Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1099-1100 (S.D. Me. 1973).
114. See Susan Diane Larsen, Note, The Right of a State to Sue as Parens Patriae, 19 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 471, 477 (1983).
115. U.S. CONST. art. in. See also Comment, State Protection of its Economy and Environment:
Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411, 412 (1970).
116. See id.; MIV Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1101; Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at
507-514. Note, however, that at least two courts have held that a state lacks standing to recover dam-
ages. State v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59 (N.D. 1972); Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc.,
232 A.2d 69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967); see also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
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the state's role as guardian of the entity," 7 or the state's quasi-sovereign
interest in the general welfare of its residents."'
A. Establishing Standing to Bring Suit
The doctrine of standing places a limitation on cases that may come
before courts."9 Generally, standing requires that (1) a plaintiff have a
sufficient direct interest in the outcome of the action to render the contro-
versy justiciable, (2) the defendant caused the alleged injury, and (3) the
alleged injury is redressable by the court. 21 When a state's direct, pro-
prietary interest in its property has been injured, and the state's injury may
be relieved by monetary or declaratory relief, that state generally will have
standing.' A state's outright ownership of a resource would thereby
constitute a sufficiently direct interest to provide standing to recover from
injury to the resource. 2
But states do not hold title to their wildlife; rather, they own wildlife
as sovereign.1 3 Courts have generally found sovereign ownership to be
an insufficient proprietary interest for purposes of standing.'24 Nonethe-
117. See George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Patens Patriae: The State as Parent or Ty-
rant?, 25 DEPAuL L. REv. 895, 895-97 (1976).
118. Id. at 907-08.
119. See Larsen, supra note 114, at 471; Martha Colhoun & Timothy S. Hamill, Comment, En-
vironmental Standing in the Ninth Circuit: Wading through the Quagmire, 15 PUB. LAND. L. RFEV.
249, 251-52 (1994).
120. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
121. See Colhoun & Hamill, supra note 119, at 253 ("Traditionally, a plaintiff had to allege
injury to an economic interest or a property right to establish standing.").
122. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447-49 (1945); MIV Tamano,
357 F. Supp. at 1101.
123. An owner claiming title to wild animals must have possession of them, and can claim them
as property; in contrast, the state, as sovereign owner, does not have possession, and arguably claims
only the "power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource." Douglas v. Sea-
coast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979);
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 539-540 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting); but see 30 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2506 (1980) (specifically vesting the state with a proprietary interest in fish "sufficient to give
it standing... to recover damages in a civil action against any person who kills any fish or who in-
jures any streams ... by pollution or littering").
124. In Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., for example, the Pennsylvania court considered whether
the state's property interest inferae naturae supported a suit in trespass for damages. 232 A.2d 69 (Ila.
1967). Wild fish in the creek waters of the state had been killed by pollution resulting from the
defendant's operations. Pennsylvania brought suit to recover damages based on its "property interest
either as sovereign or proprietor in all wild game and fish in the Commonwealth." Id. at 70. It sup-
ported this interest with cases upholding the state's authority to regulate wild game for its preservation
and protection. Id. The Pennsylvania court held that the state's power to regulate wild fish and game
resulted from its
sovereignty over the land and the people[, blut it is not the owner of the fish as it is of its
lands and buildings so as to support a civil action for damages resulting from the destruc-
tion of those fish which have not been reduced to possession.
Id. at 71. The state's property interest did not give it sufficient standing to sue.
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less, courts have consistently held that sovereign ownership does represent
another type of interest-a quasi-sovereign interest-that is sufficient to
give states standing under the doctrine of parens patriae.as
The parens patriae doctrine, like the public trust doctrine, developed
at English common law." The notion of parens patriae, or "parent of
the country,"'27 originated as the king's ability to exercise power in cer-
tain instances." Under the king's prerogative, the king was "the guard-
ian of his people," and could exercise authority to take care of people who
were legally unable to take care of themselves or their property. 9 Under
this theory, people protected by the king basically fell into three classes:
infants, "idiots," and "lunatics."' 30 With respect to children, the Crown's
parens patriae role was as the "supreme guardian and superintendent,''
and derived from a "trust" relationship.'
At American common law, the doctrine of parens patriae applies
more broadly, allowing the state to bring suit whenever it can show a
Similarly, in Stuart v. Dickinson Cheese Co., Inc., the court concluded that the state's power to
protect fish and game is an attribute inherent in sovereign power, but that as sovereign the state does
not have "such property interest in the fish while they are in a wild state" to support a civil action for
damages. 200 N.W.2d 59, 61 (N.D. 1972). As in Agway, the Dickinson Cheese court merely consid-
ered the sufficiency of the state's property interest in its wildlife deriving from its sovereignty, not
whether the quasi-sovereign interest in the general welfare was sufficient. Id.
However, in Selma Pressure Treating v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., the California Court
of Appeals concluded that a state's usufructuary interest in water was a sufficient property interest for
standing under a statute to seek damages associated with hazardous waste disposal. 271 Cal. Rptr. 596,
605-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). The court distinguished between a state acting in its representative capac-
ity to protect the public interest, and a state having a property interest that has been injured. Id. at 603.
The court based its conclusion that the state's property interest in its waters was sufficient to support
the state's standing to sue on the state's usufructuary ownership interest in water. Id. at 605-06. The
state was not acting in its representative capacity. See id.
125. See, e.g., MIV Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1100-01; In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp.
38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, (D. Alaska Jan. 19, 1993).
126. Curtis, supra note 117, at 896-97.
127. Id. at 896 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICnIoNARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979)).
128. Id. Blackstone defines the king's prerogative as:
that special pre-eminence, which the king hath over and above all other persons, and out of
I the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity.... [The prerogative]
can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the king enjoys alone.., and not
to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects.
1 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239.
129. Curtis, supra note 117, at 896 (quoting J. CHrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF Tm PRE-
ROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 155 (1820)). This entitlement to exercise authority was also considered a
duty of the Crown in return for the allegiance paid to his Majesty by his subjects. Id.
130. IL
131. Id. at 897 (quoting Eyre v. The Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 102, 24 Eng. Rep. 659
(Ch. 1722)). Parens patriae suits have been exercised by states to prevent injury to those who could
not protect themselves, such as juveniles. Larsen, supra note 114, at 473 n.30. While this approach has
not been recognized by courts in considering states' standing to sue for damages to wildlife, it may be
a valid approach in that wildlife, like juveniles, cannot protect itself.
132. See Curtis, supra note 117, at 897.
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direct interest in the damaged resource independent of the individual inter-
ests of its citizens.'33 In other words, the state must act on its own be-
half, rather than merely seek recovery for the benefit of particular indi-
viduals who are the real parties in interest.'34 Importantly, a state's direct
interests include not only proprietary interests, but also the general quasi-
sovereign interests it exercises on behalf of its citizens as a whole.'35
Quasi-sovereign interests include a state's general economic well-be-
ing,"' its environment,"' and the health, comfort, and welfare of its
populace.'38 When any of these interests is imperiled, the state may bring
suit to recover damages or enjoin the threatening activity.'39 Although
protection of wildlife arguably falls under the state's quasi-sovereign in-
terest in protecting the enivronment, t' ° several courts applying the parens
patriae doctrine in the wildlife context have looked instead to sovereign
ownership theory, and ultimately the public trust doctrine, to find a suffi-
cient quasi-sovereign interest to protect public trust resources.1 4'
133. Id. at 907.
134. MIV Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1100 (citations omitted); In re Steuart, 495 F. Supp. at 40.
When public interest groups seek to sue on behalf of their members and the public interest, it may
become difficult to determine whether the state's interest is distinct from that of the public interest
group. If both represent the same interest, they may not bring separate suits because of the doctrine of
res judicata. See Larsen, supra note 114, at 479. For an interesting discussion of this potential issue,
see Miles Tolbert, Comment, The Public as Plaintiff. Public Nuisance and Federal Citizen Suits in the
Exxon Valdez Litigation, 14 HARV. ENTL. L. REv. 511 (1990).
135. See MIV Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1099-1100 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 258 (1979)); id. at 1102. The U.S. Supreme Court enunciated the general rule for states bringing
suit under the doctrine of parens patriae based on their quasi-sovereign interests in Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). While that case involved a state's claim for damages to its
economic welfare from defendants' acts in restraint of trade, the distinctions the court makes between
a state's proprietary interests and its quasi-sovereign interests lay the framework for parens patriae
suits to protect a state's natural resources. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D.
Haw. 1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972). In Pennsylvania R.R.,
the Court noted that
[The interests of the State are not confined to those which are proprietary; they embrace
the so-called 'quasi-sovereign' interests which ... are 'independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.'
324 U.S. at 447-48 (citations omitted). Georgia asserted standing based on its proprietary interest as
owner of the railroad and on its quasi-sovereign interest as representative of the state's general eco-
nomic welfare. Id. at 443.
136. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. at 450-51.
137. Standard Oil, 301 F. Supp. at 982.
138. Comment, supra note 115, at 412.
139. See id. at 412-13 (citations omitted).
140. See Larsen, supra note 114, at 477 (asserting that an independent sovereign interest is not
hard to identify in disputes over the environment); In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, slip op. at
13-14.
141. See, e.g., Selma Pressure Treating, 271 Cal. Rptr. 596. In Selma Pressure Treating, the
court bolstered its conclusion that a state's usufructuary interest in water was a sufficient proprietary
interest to impart standing by noting authority under the public trust doctrine. Id. at 605-06. The court
concluded that "[tihe state's public trust interest in the navigable portions of the American River is
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For instance, in Maine v. M/V Tamano,'" the court reasoned that a
state's sovereign ownership of its waters and marine life constitutes a
sufficiently direct interest to maintain a damages claim.'43 The court did
not uphold standing based on the state's quasi-sovereign interest in the
environment, but rather based on the state's sovereign ownership of its
marine life.'" Similarly, in Maryland v. Amerada Hess Co.,45 the
court relied on sovereign ownership and public trust theories to find that
the state had standing to bring suit as parens patriae.'6 In Amerada
Hess, the state sought to recover damages caused by an oil spill in the
Baltimore Harbor. The power to bring suit, the court reasoned, is associat-
ed with the state's "fictional" ownership of those waters. 47 The
"fictional" or "technical" ownership creates the state's role as trustee of its
waters.'" In this trustee role, the state has the power to bring suit to pro-
tect the corpus of this trust for its beneficiaries.'" Thus, state ownership
of its waters, even though merely fictional, sufficiently supports standing
to sue.
As demonstrated, courts have consistently concluded that states have
standing to sue under the doctrine of parens patriae on the basis of their
sovereign ownership of their resources, for sovereign ownership satisfies
the quasi-sovereign interest requirement. Historically, there was a distinc-
tion in rights based on whether standing was derived from a direct propri-
etary interest or from the state's quasi-sovereign interest. 5 Parens patri-
similarly sufficient for standing to claim damages caused by environmental pollution," id. at 605, and
that by that line of reasoning the state's parens patriae interest is clear (noting a line of cases granting
the state the right to seek money damages based on its parens patriae interest in its air, land, and
waters). Id. at 605-06.
142. 357 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Me. 1973).
143. MIV Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1099-1100.
144. See id.
145. 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
146. Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. at 1066-67.
147. Id. at 1067. The court uses the term "technical ownership," and quotes Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948), to support the proposition that this type of ownership grants states the au-
thority to exercise "for the common good ... all the authority that technical ownership ordinarily
confers." Id. The Toomer reasoning with regard to ownership was also used to support the Supreme
Court ruling that such ownership is "fictional." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979); see
also supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
148. "It is just this 'technical' ownership that the State of Maryland has in its waters that gives it
the legal right to bring suit on behalf of the public in order to serve the 'common good' of its citi-
zens." Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. at 1067.
149. Id. Interestingly, in assessing ownership of waters of the Baltimore Harbor for purposes of
bringing suit to protect the corpus of the state's trust, the court reasoned that the waters were owned
by the state as sovereign in a similar capacity to the state ownership of wildlife outlined in Geer, and
that the state therefore had the authority to bring suit as trustee of the waters of the harbor. Id. at
1066.
150. See Larsen, supra note 114, at 473-74.
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ae suits on behalf of the state's quasi-sovereign interests invoked only
equitable relief, such as declaratory judgments and injunctions.'' Thus,
where states lacked a direct proprietary interest, they could not collect
damages.' As explained above, the state's sovereign ownership of its
wildlife is not a proprietary form of ownership. 5 Thus, suits seeking
damages on the basis of this ownership failed.
The courts in Commonwealth v. Agway"5 4 and State v. Dickinson
Cheese,' for example, held that the state did not have standing to ob-
tain damages for harm caused to fish.'56 In the Agway and Dickinson
Cheese cases, the courts based their decisions on the nature of the state's
relationship to the fish resource. Both courts reasoned that although the
state has the authority to regulate the taking of fish, it does not have an
ownership interest in wild fish sufficient to support a claim for damag-
es.'57 Importantly, neither court addressed the claims in terms of the
parens patriae doctrine.'58 Rather, they looked solely to the state's pro-
prietary interest. Moreover, these cases have not been followed by a sig-
nificant number of courts and have been distinguished in at least one in-
stance.'59
These isolated cases, which disallow a state's claims for natural re-
sources damages, nevertheless have led some commentators to urge states
to enact statutes codifying the state's right to recover natural resource
damages."6 Although codification of this right may prove useful, the
common law doctrine of parens patriae continues to apply in a substantial
number of states. 6 ' Even in states that have codified natural resource
151. Id. at 480.
152. Id.; see, e.g., Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 262-65. But see Larsen, supra note 114, at 481
(describing a prior, contrary holding in Pennsylvania R.R., and concluding, "The Court's failure to
reconcile these conflicting decisions leaves unanswered the question of whether a state can actually
recover damages for economic injury in its parens patriae capacity.").
153. See supra notes 123-25, 135-41 and accompanying text.
154. 232 A.2d 69 (Pa. 1967).
155. 200 N.W.2d 59 (N.D. 1972).
156. These cases did not address the question of the availability of injunctive relief.
157. See Agway, 232 A.2d at 70-71 (reasoning that the state as sovereign has the power to regu-
late fish and game, but because the state is not their owner it cannot bring an action for damages);
accord Dickinson Cheese, 200 N.W.2d at 61.
158. In Agway, the state brought its claim under trespass theory. 232 A.2d at 69. Although the
Dickinson Cheese court did not expressly indicate the legal basis upon which the state brought its
claim, it did consider whether an antipollution statute provides a right to maintain a damages suit. 200
N.W.2d at 61.
159. State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975) (rejecting Agway and noting that the Dickinson Cheese court had based its decision, at least in
part, on the interpretation of a statute), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (NJ. 1976).
160. Faith Halter & Joel T. Thomas, Recovery of Damages by States for Fish and Wildlife Loss-
es Caused by Pollution, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 5, 13 (1982); see also supra note 123.
161. Id.
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damages, the parens patriae doctrine may complement the state legislation
unless the statute preempts common law.'62
B. Fulfilling Public Trust Obligations as Parens Patriae
The parens patriae doctrine essentially provides a mechanism for the
state to fulfill its public trust obligations. Indeed, the two doctrines are
inextricably linked. 63 In State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.,"M
the court recognized this link when it combined the doctrines and ruled
that the state had the right and the fiduciary duty to collect damages for
destruction of wildlife, a part of the corpus of the public trust.'
65
In Jersey Central, an unscheduled shutdown at Jersey Central
Power's atomic power plant resulted in a sudden drop in water tempera-
ture, which led to the death of 500,000 fish." The New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection brought an enforcement action under
state statutory and common law theories.67 Jersey Central moved to dis-
miss the state's common law count that sought damages for injury to
wildlife as parens patriae. Jersey Central argued that parens patriae pro-
vides standing for injunctive relief only. 68
The court rejected Jersey Central's attempt to limit parens patriae to
injunctive relief. It reasoned that the state, as trustee, must have the ability
to seek reimbursement for the corpus of the trust when it suffers a diminu-
tion of value. On appeal, the appellate division upheld the trial court's
reasoning that:
The State has not only the right but also the affirmative fiduciary obliga-
tion to ensure that the rights of the public to a viable marine environment
are protected, and to seek compensation for any diminution in that trust
corpus. 7°
Other courts have similarly concluded that a state has a fiduciary obliga-
tion to seek damages. For example, the courts in In re Steuart Transporta-
162. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
163. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980); State v. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 674 (N.J.L. Div. 1973), affld, 336 A.2d 750 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975), rev'd, 351 A.2d 337 (NJ. 1976); State v. Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1974).
164. 308 A.2d 671.
165. Jersey Cent., 308 A.2d at 674.
166. Id. at 672.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 673.
169. Id. at 673-74.
170. 336 A.2d 750, 759 (NJ. App. Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337, 344 (NJ.
1976) (emphasis added).
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tion Co. 7' and Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserv-
ing, Inc.' explain the state's fiduciary obligation in virtually the same
terms as the Jersey Central court.'7 3
The Jersey Central court's conclusion that the state may recover
damages raises the difficult issue of determining an appropriate measure of
damages. Many scholars have noted the difficulty in placing a value on
our natural resources.' Nonetheless, such valuation is critical for ensur-
ing environmental protection. Both courts and legislatures have made
efforts to develop mechanisms for valuing environmental harm. 7 The
court, in Jersey Central, refused to "speculate" as to the monetary value of
the environmental damage and awarded the state the market value of the
dead fish.'76 Other courts have used the restoration value rather than
market value as the appropriate measure of damages.'
Legislatures have also addressed the issue of how to assess natural
resource damages. For instance, Congress included natural resource dam-
age provisions in the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act'78 ("CERCLA") and the Oil Pollution Act of
1990179 ("OPA"). CERCLA and OPA regulations further provide a
mechanism for developing natural resource damage assessments.' OPA
provides that damages include the cost of restoration, rehabilitation, or re-
placement, together with the diminution in value of the resources."
CERCLA provides a similar scheme. 2 In assessing the appropriate
amount of natural resource damages in cases brought under the parens
patriae doctrine, courts can look to this existing statutory and regulatory
framework for guidance.
171. 495 F. Supp. at 40.
172. 271 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
173. See also State v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
174. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269
(1989).
175. Id. at 272.
176. Jersey Cent., 308 A.2d at 674.
177. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1344-45 (D.P.R.
1978) (awarding Puerto Rico the costs of restoring the affected areas to the condition before the casu-
alty), affd in part and vacated in part, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981).
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
179. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
180. Cross, supra note 174, at 275.
181. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0.
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IV. THE NEED TO INVOKE THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO PROTECT
WILDLIFE
The common law doctrines of the public trust and parens patriae
establish states' duty to protect their wildlife resources and provide a
means by which states may assert lawsuits on behalf of these resources.
The public trust doctrine is founded upon the notion of sovereign owner-
ship of natural resources. Parens patriae is based upon the notion of the
sovereign's duty to protect entities whose interests otherwise might not be
satisfactorily represented in the courts. Although the case law that invokes
these doctrines for the protection of wildlife and other natural resources
establishes their precedential value, these doctrines work their way into
law review articles with much greater frequency than into court decisions.
A primary reason that these doctrines do not enter the litigation arena
more frequently may be the availability of alternative sources of law for
natural resource protection, especially in the years following the Mono
Lake decision. The state's police power, state constitutions, and state and
federal legislation all help to enforce the state's obligation to protect wild-
life. Some critics of the public trust doctrine contend that the doctrine
should no longer be recognized by the courts because these other sources
of state obligation somehow render it unnecessary.'83 These critics con-
tend that the sovereign ownership theory should be abandoned, and the
public trust duties should be enforced by way of these alternative sourc-
es.
18 4
Although these alternative sources may represent efforts to acknowl-
edge and implement the state's trust duties, they do not render the public
trust doctrine obsolete. In fact, recent threats to state and federal legisla-
tive protections may trigger a greater need to harness this elusive doctrine
to protect the wildlife resource. Public trust doctrine critics overlook the
basis for the doctrine's judicial origins. The public trust doctrine protects
natural resources, and therefore the public, from the failure of legislatures,
state agencies, and administrative personnel to recognize the state's duty to
protect the corpus of the wildlife trust for future generations.'85 Other
common law doctrines and statutory enactments cannot replace the vital
role of the public trust doctrine. Courts cannot ignore the substantial com-
mon law that has developed the public trust and parens patriae doctrines.
Alternative sources of authority do not provide the necessary judicial
check on the legislative and administrative branches provided by the pub-
183. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 11, at 631-33, 658, 691-716.
184. See id. at 656-58.
185. See Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 455; Lazarus, supra note 11, at 656-57; Sax, Public Trust
Doctrine, supra note 9, at 489, 521.
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lic trust doctrine, nor do these sources provide the requisite standing for
states to fulfill their public trust duties.
For instance, the police power'86 indisputably provides states with
the requisite authority to regulate wildlife. Courts consistently uphold
wildlife regulatory authority under police power theory.'87 In fact, the
state's police power was noted as a source for state wildlife regulatory
authority in the landmark Geer v. Connecticut8' decision, and was pre-
served by the Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma.'89 Since Geer and Hughes,
numerous U.S. Supreme Court"9° and state court 9' decisions have ac-
186. The police power, while elusive of exact definition, generally connotes the government's
power to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its people. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 n.6 (1964); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). In an
early Massachusetts case, Chief Justice Shaw defined the police power as:
the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and wel-
fare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
George W. Wickersham, The Police Power, A Product of the Rule of Reason, 27 HARV. L. REv. 297,
304 (1914) (citing Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851)); see also Berman, 348
U.S. at 32-33; ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3
(1904). The police power embodies the state's sovereign power to govern, and is exercised by the
states subject only to constitutional limitations. Id. The objective of the police power is to secure and
promote the public welfare, and it is accomplished by way of restraint and compulsion. Id.
187. See, e.g., State v. Jack, 539 P.2d 726 (Mont. 1975). "Montana recognizes both the doctrine
of sovereign ownership and the police power theory." Id. at 728. Further, the court explained:
[A] state has the power to preserve and regulate its wildlife. In the nineteenth century, it
was commonly held that this power derived from the common law concept of "sovereign
ownership.".. . Under more modem theory, the power has been held to lie within the pur-
view of a state's police power.
Id.; see also O'Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Wyo. 1986) ("[T]he wildlife within the bor-
ders of a state are owned by the state in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all its peo-
ple. Because of such ownership and in the exercise of its police power, the state may regulate the
taking and use thereof.").
188. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). The Geer Court observed that "it is within the police power of the
State ... to make such laws as will best preserve such game, and secure its beneficial use in the fu-
ture to the citizens, and to that end it may adopt any reasonable regulations." Id. at 533 (citations
omitted). It should also be noted that the authority to enact game laws under the police power may be
traced back to the English common law. See FREUND, supra note 186, at 2 (citing 4 WILLIAhI
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *162-75).
189. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The Hughes Court considered "the States' interests in conservation
and protection of wild animals [to be] legitimate local purposes similar to the States' interests in pro-
tecting the health and safety of their citizens." Id. at 337. The Hughes court thus implicitly upheld
state authority to regulate wildlife under its police power.
190. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978); Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1975); Missouri v. Holland, 526 U.S. 416, 434 (1920); see also New
York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 40, 43-44 (1908) (holding constitutional a state law pro-
hibiting possession of game during the closed season).
191. The Montana Supreme Court has noted that "[alside from any question of common owner-
ship, the state may exercise these rights [of granting or withholding the right to hunt and imposing
conditions on that right] in virtue of its police power." Rosenfeld v. Jakways, 216 P. 776, 777 (Mont
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knowledged police power authority to regulate wildlife.
Nevertheless, case law does not definitively use the police power as
the basis for the state's affirmative duty to take action to protect this re-
source."9 Despite clear police power authority, courts that have consid-
ered state authority to regulate wildlife have relied primarily upon sover-
eign ownership theory to endorse the states' actions.'93 Courts have pro-
mulgated sovereign ownership theory for a reason: The duties associated
with sovereign ownership of wildlife extend beyond the authority to pro-
tect the health, safety and welfare of the people. They mandate that the
state take action to protect its wildlife resource.
Another important distinction between the functions of the police
power and the public trust doctrine lies in the role of the judiciary. Where-
as the role of the judiciary in reviewing a state's exercise of its police
power is very narrow,'94 the judiciary plays a greater role in evaluating
state actions under the public trust doctrine.' Courts will uphold a
state's exercise of its police power so long as it is reasonably related to a
legitimate government purpose."' Under the public trust doctrine, courts
scrutinize the state's action under a more discerning standard.' 97 If a
1923). Years later, the Montana court noted:
There is no question that a state has the power to preserve and regulate its wildlife. In the
nineteenth century, it was commonly held that this power derived from the common law
concept of "sovereign ownership."... Under more modem theory, the power has been held
to lie within the purview of a state's police powers.
Jack, 539 P.2d at 728 (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring nonresident hunters to be accompa-
nied by resident guides for violation of equal protection).
The Wyoming Supreme Court similarly has assessed state regulatory authority over game and
fish laws under the police power. Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d 412, 414 (Wyo. 1973). So has the Wash-
ington Supreme Court. State ex rel. Lopas v. Shagren, 157 P. 31, 33 (Wash. 1916) (holding that the
state can protect game birds, animals and fish within state borders under the police power); State v.
Towessnute, 154 P. 805, 808 (Wash. 1916) (police power extends to conservation of fish).
192. There is an implied (and sometimes express) duty of the state to protect the health, safety
and welfare of its citizens. See Wickersham, supra note 186, at 305:
[1]t is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty, of a state to advance the safety,
happiness, and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and
every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends ....
Id. (quoting Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837)). Nevertheless, courts
typically rely on sovereign ownership theory to support the notion of a state's duty to protect its wild-
life, as separate from its authority to do so.
193. See, e.g., Hughes, 441 U.S. 322, 334; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948); supra
notes 33, 50-56 and accompanying text.
194. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
195. See Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 478.
196. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 ("The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive....
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.") The breadth
of the scope of the police power has alarmed some commentators, see generally Wickersham, supra
note 186, and has led others to contend that the public trust doctrine is not necessary to provide state
authority to legislate to conserve wildlife and other natural resources. See Lazarus, supra note 11, at
665-68.
197. Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 478. The standard of review of government
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court determines that the wildlife resource will be impaired, it may strike
down an action even if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government
interest.'
Because of these differing standards of review, if a state were to
affirmatively enact legislation to protect its wildlife resource, the legisla-
tion most likely would be upheld as reasonably related to a legitimate
interest.199 However, if the state were to pass legislation that would fur-
ther the public welfare at the expense of the wildlife resource, this exer-
cise of the police power likewise might be upheld.2O Under the police
power alone, courts do not enforce a state's affirmative duty to protect its
wildlife." 1 In contrast, under the public trust doctrine, states must protect
the corpus of their wildlife trust. Thus, a state's police power does not
supplant public trust considerations in regulating a state's wildlife and
furthering the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.
In addition to the authority conferred by the police power, many state
constitutions acknowledge the state's trustee capacity with respect to its
natural resources. 2 ' While the language of these constitutions varies,0 3
conduct under the public trust doctrine is "more rigorous than that applicable to governmental activity
generally." Id.
198. See Jeffrey L. Amestoy & Mark J. Di Stefano, Wildlife Habitat Protection through State-
Wide Land Use Regulation, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 45, 46 (1990); see also Florida Game & Fresh
Water Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla, Inc., 636 So. 2d 761 (1994).
199. See Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 324 (1920) (it is within the police power
of the state to legislate for the conservation of the state natural resources).
200. When regulating development, for example, states and localities typically do not consider
any encroachment upon habitat or other impacts on wildlife. While development poses one of the
greatest threats to wildlife, legislation that allows it has historically been upheld under the police pow-
er. See Amestoy & Di Stefano, supra note 198, at 47.
201. Under the police power, states are required to protect the wildlife resource only as neces-
sary to advance the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. See Wickersham, supra note 186, at
305.
202. For instance, the Hawaii Constitution mandates that, "For the benefit of present and future
generations, the State... shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural re-
sources," concluding that "[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of
the people." HAw. CONST. art. XI, § 1. It further provides that "[e]ach person has the right to a clean
and healthful environment." HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
Similarly, the Montana Constitution provides, "The state and each person shall maintain and
improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations." MONT.
CONST. art IX, § 1(1) (emphasis added). This provision mandates that the state maintain the environ-
ment for the future, recognizing that the state holds the environment in trust for the benefit of the
people. See id.
203. State constitutions typically address the public trust duty by referencing citizens' right to a
clean and healthful environment and naming the state as trustee for its resources. For instance, the
Pennsylvania Constitution provides that:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural re-
sources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
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state courts have interpreted the provisions as constitutionalizing the com-
mon law principle and imposing an enforceable public trust duty on the
state to protect its natural resources.2
Although these constitutional provisions may appear to duplicate the
common law public trust doctrine, they do not render it obsolete. First, a
majority of states do not have constitutional provisions.2?' Second, courts
rely heavily on the common law development of the public trust doctrine
to interpret these constitutions.'ta Finally, these constitutional provisions
must be self-executing in order to impose an enforceable duty on the state
to protect its wildlife resource.2 7 Otherwise, legislative enactment pursu-
ant to the constitutional provision is necessary to enforce the trust.0 '
Courts and scholars are mixed as to whether the trustee provisions are
self-executing.
Lastly, state and federal statutes recognize the government's role as
trustee of its natural resources for future generations. For instance, most
states210 have enacted environmental protection acts modeled after the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 ' Many states have statutes
providing the state a right to sue to recover for natural resource damag-
benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. See also LA. CONST. art. IX, § I ("The natural resources of the state... shall
be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible"). Another type of constitutional provision
is the common use clause, which provides, "Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife,
and waters are reserved to the people for common use." ALASKA CONsT. art. VIII, § 3.
204. See Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 495-96 (Alaska 1988) (interpreting the common use
clause to impose on the state "a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state
for the benefit of all the people"); American Waste and Pollution Control Co., 642 So. 2d 1258, 1262
(La. 1994) (noting that the constitutional provision "continues the Public Trust Doctrine in environ-
mental matters"); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (concluding that the
framers of the state constitution intended to "constitutionally affix[] a public trust concept to the man-
agement of public natural resources of Pennsylvania").
205. Susan D. Bauer, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool to Make Federal Administra-
tive Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and its Resources, 15 B.C. ENvTm. AFF. L. REV.
385, 426-27 n.326 (1988).
206. See, e.g., Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 94 (relying on the common law of wildlife to interpret the
Alaska constitutional provision).
207. See generally Tammy Wyatt-Shaw, Comment, The Doctrine of Self-Execution and the Envi-
ronmental Prbvisions of the Montana State Constitution: "They Mean Something," 15 PUB. LAND L.
Rav. 219 (1994); Kelly, supra note 33, at 913-16.
208. See Wyatt-Shaw, supra note 207, at 222-27.
209. See id. at 230-235.
210. See, e.g., MEPA, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to 324 (1993).
211. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under NEPA, Congress declared a
national environmental policy requiring the federal government "to use all practicable means...
to ... (1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for future genera-
tions.' § 4331(b)(1). Most states adopted language similar to the federal language, recognizing as state
policy the trustee responsibilities of the state government and of each generation with respect to the
environment. See, e.g., MEPA, MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-103(2) (using identical trustee language).
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es.212 While legislative enactments of trust duties such as these do im-
pose a duty on the states similar to that of the public trust, they fall short
of the public trust duty both in the scope of the duty imparted, and to the
extent that they are subject to modification or repeal by subsequent legis-
latures. As illustrated by the Montana Sheep case, NEPA and its state
protegees create a less substantive duty than that mandated by the public
trust doctrine.2"3 Under the NEPA requirements, the government must
consider a range of alternatives before taking any action that will signifi-
cantly affect the environment." 4 Under the public trust doctrine, the gov-
ernment not only must consider a range of alternatives, but it must adopt
the most feasible alternative that will least impair the corpus of the
trust.
15
Further, the duty and authority imparted by legislative action is limit-
ed to the parameters embodied in the language of the statutes. Under the
public trust doctrine, a state's duty to protect the trust corpus extends be-
yond the scope of existing legislation." 6 States must bring suit to protect
their natural resources under the public trust doctrine regardless of whether
legislation provides them a cause of action, so long as any existing statute
does not directly preclude common law actions."7 The scope of the
state's power to bring suit under the common law encompasses all matters
for which the state has the power to legislate.2"'
The public trust doctrine imposes a duty on the state that extends
212. Halter & Thomas, supra note 160, at 9.
213. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (regarding the Montana Sheep case).
214. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (stating that the purpose of reviewing a range of alternatives is to insure a fully
informed and well-considered decision); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
215. See supra notes 71-78, 93-96 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Maryland v. Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (D. Md. 1972). The
court appealed to public policy imperatives, noting that to require legislation to be in place would
"unnecessarily tie the hands of the State in its war against pollution." Id. at 1067. This result would be
unacceptable and highly costly to the public. Id.
217. The state's power to regulate pursuant to its police power does not preclude the state from
seeking relief for injury to its natural resources in a court of law when no statute has been enacted for
that purpose. Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. at 1066-67. The Amerada Hess court noted:
The Court has not been directed to and indeed is unaware of any rule of law which holds
that the power of a state to legislate concerning a given matter precludes the state from
bringing a common law suit to accomplish the same purpose and to redress the same wrong
which a statute might seek to correct.
Id. at 1066. See also Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 271 Cal. Rptr.
596, 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
218. In Amerada Hess, a suit brought by the state for recovery of damages to the waters of the
state from an oil spill in the Baltimore Harbor, the court reasoned that if a state has the power to legis-
late with regard to a certain matter, it follows that the state has the power to bring common law suits
in the absence of legislation to achieve the same result. 350 F. Supp. at 1066-67.
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beyond any duty imposed under the police power, constitution, or statutes.
Together with the doctrine of parens patriae, it protects the wildlife re-
source from exercises of the police power that may bear a reasonable
relation to the health, safety, and welfare of the people but that significant-
ly impair the wildlife base, when feasible alternatives are available. The
public trust and parens patriae doctrines provide clear guidance for the
courts to review state actions together with standing for states to sue, even
when the extent to which constitutional provisions are self-executing is un-
clear. They protect the wildlife resource from the whims of any given
legislature, mandate more substantive protection of the state's wildlife
resources than the procedural dictates of most statutes, and provide the
state a cause of action regardless of whether legislation is in place. Thus,
these alternative sources of authority, while helpful in buttressing wildlife
protection, do not render the public trust doctrine obsolete.
V. CONCLUSION
In a period when the United States Congress and state legislatures
threaten to weaken environmental laws in an effort to protect private prop-
erty rights, the continued application of the public trust doctrine remains
crucial. If wildlife protection set forth by statute or constitution is ham-
pered, the public trust and parens patriae doctrines can play an important
role to ensure protection. If existing statutory and constitutional
protections remain intact, the public trust and parens patriae doctrines still
provide wildlife protection that differs from and complements constitution-
al, statutory, and common law theories.
The strength of the public trust and parens patriae doctrines lies in
the flexibility they afford the judiciary. When called upon to protect com-
mon resources under these doctrines, courts can flesh out the public trust
duty on a case-by-case basis. In the wildlife context, courts can look to the
public trust cases involving water issues for guidance. Based on existing
public trust doctrine case law, the state must: (1) consider the potential
adverse impacts of any proposed activity over which it has administrative
authority; (2) allow only those activities that do not substantially impair
the state's wildlife resources; (3) continually monitor the impacts of an
approved activity on the wildlife to ensure preservation of the corpus of
the trust; and (4) bring suit to enjoin harmful activities and/or to recover
for damages to its wildlife under the parens patriae doctrine 19 Courts
may adapt this general framework to the cases before them.
The role the judiciary should play in applying the public trust doe-
trine springs from the core of the public trust doctrine. The state's rela-
219. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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tionships to water and to wildlife both stem from the notion of sovereign
ownership of common resources. The citizenry has the expectation that the
sovereign will protect the common resources. The judiciary should act to
ensure that citizen expectations are met.
